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RETAIL CONTRACTING: THEORY AND PRACTICE*
Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade
We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical
literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and
their exclusive resellers. We do this using studies of traditional and
business-format-franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales-
force-integration decisions. Some of the patterns that we uncover are
consistent with a standard incentive-cum-insurance theory of organ-
ization, while others are not. We brie£y review some theoretical
extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming
con£icts between theory and practice.
i. introduction
Manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their
products to consumers themselves (vertical integration) or to sell via
independent retailers (vertical separation). When manufacturers do not
perform the sales function internally, but want exclusive retailers, they
usually choose some form of franchising.1 Many theories attempt to
explain the choice of retail-organizational form. Moreover, a considerable
body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating. We
attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories.
To accomplish this task, we assess studies of franchising arrangements as
well as studies of sales-force organization in industrial settings.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we highlight a
number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail
contracting. In particular, we ¢nd that:
(i) Risk is positively related to the use of high-powered incentives
(vertical separation).
(ii) The importance of the agent's e¡ort in production is positively
related to the use of high-powered incentives.
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1 There are two forms of franchising: traditional and business-format. Traditional
franchising, which involves an upstream producer and a downstream seller (e.g., gasoline), is
the most common form. Business-format franchising, however, is the faster growing category.
With business-format franchising, the franchisor provides a trademark, a marketing strategy,
and quality control to the franchisee in exchange for royalty payments and up-front fees.
Production, however, typically takes place at the retail outlet (e.g., fast-food).
(iii) Larger units tend to be company-operated.
(iv) High costs of monitoring output or sales are positively related to
company operation.
(v) High costs of monitoring e¡ort directly are negatively related to
company operation.
(vi) Retail prices are lower under company operation than under fran-
chising.
Some of these regularities are consistent with the familiar agency model
of retail contracting that is based on the need for franchisee insurance
and incentives, but a number of them are not. Furthermore, certain
regularities (e.g., points four and ¢ve above) appear to be mutually
contradictory. After highlighting those areas where the data support the
theory, as well as those where they do not, we discuss extensions to the
agency model and other explanations that could account for the patterns
that are revealed by the data.
ii. empirical evidence
Our discussion of the empirical evidence is organized around the factors
that theory suggests should be important determinants of retail-
organization form. Before turning to the evidence, we therefore give a brief
overview of the principal relevant theories.
Most theories of the relationship between manufacturer and exclusive
retailer or reseller are based on the idea that an unconstrained ¢rst-best
outcome cannot be achieved due to agency costs.2 For example, the
manufacturer or principal faces a tradeo¡ between providing the retailer
or agent with insurance against risk and with incentives to work hard.
Alternatively, incentive problems can arise on both sides of the principal/
agent relationship, in which case the contract must trade o¡ incentives for
one party against incentives for the other. In general, the constrained-
optimal form of organization balances the costs and bene¢ts associated
with production, transaction, and agency considerations.
Recently, theorists have also examined the implications for
manufacturer/retailer contracts of imperfect competition in retail markets
that leads to strategic behavior on the part of manufacturers.3 In an
oligopoly context, it has been shown that principals can often bene¢t from
delegating the authority to set the retail price to an agent who purchases
the product at a wholesale price that is typically above marginal cost.
2 The relative agency costs of integration and separation are analyzed by Coase [1937],
Williamson [1971], Alchian and Demsetz [1972], Klein, Crawford, and Alchian [1978], Rubin
[1978], Fama and Jensen [1983], Mathewson and Winter [1985], and others.
3 For example, Vickers [1985], Bonanno and Vickers [1988], Katz [1991], Sha¡er [1991],
Gal-Or [1992] and Rey and Stiglitz [1995].
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Indeed, whereas vertical integration is frequently seen as a way of
harmonizing the interests of up and downstream ¢rms, vertical separation
can harmonize the interests of competing manufacturers.4
The comparative statics from the standard incentive-cum-insurance
model are fairly well understood. We refer to these in our review of
empirical regularities below where relevant. What is perhaps less well
known is the fact that the comparative statics from an agency model
extended to include the possibility of strategic vertical separation are very
similar to those from the original model.5 This is both good and bad. On
the one hand, it strengthens the theoretical predictions, because they hold
under a wider set of circumstances. On the other hand, it makes it di¤cult
to distinguish between the two models empirically.
Much of the agency-theoretic literature on retail contracting focuses
on explaining the size of the share parameter in a franchise contract
and how this parameter should vary as other aspects of the problem
change, where the share parameter determines the partition of residual
claimancy between principal and agent.6 In real-world markets, in
contrast, instead of o¡ering contracts tailored to the characteristics of
each unit, location, and agent, most ¢rms employ a limited set of
contracts, often just twoöa franchise and an integrated contract. In
doing this, they reduce the problem of choosing the contract terms for
any particular unit from a continuum of options to a simpler
dichotomous choice.7 Consequently, much of the empirical literature
has analyzed this dichotomous choice between company operation
(vertical integration, which is associated with lower-powered incentives)
and franchising (vertical separation, which is associated with higher-
powered incentives) using arguments developed to explain how ¢rms
4There is a related literature that examines the strategic choice of managerial incentives
(e.g., Fershtman [1985], Fershtman and Judd [1987], Skilvas [1987], and Reitman [1993]) as
well as one that assesses divisionalization (e.g., Baye, Crocker, and Ju [1996]), in which
strategic motives lead to more rivalrous behavior.
5 These results are derived formally in Lafontaine and Slade [1995].
6 See for example Rubin [1978], Mathewson and Winter [1985], Lal [1990], and
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995].
7 In business-format franchising, di¡erent franchisors choose di¡erent contract termsö
di¡erent royalty rates and franchise feesöbut a given franchisor o¡ers the same terms to all
potential franchisees at a given point in time. This makes the franchise versus company-
operation dichotomy a meaningful one; if contracts were allowed to vary for each franchisee,
then, assuming for simplicity that the hired manager is paid a ¢xed salary, company
ownership would be a limit case where the royalty rate is zero and the franchise fee negative.
Of course, such a limit case would hardly ever be observed. In reality, the dichotomy involves
more than just di¡erences in the compensation scheme of the unit manager; it also involves
di¡erences in asset ownership and in the distribution of responsibilities between upstream and
downstream parties. Similarly, in traditional franchising, while commission rates and fees
can vary across a ¢rm's agents, the distinction between integration and separation is well
de¢ned. This distinction again involves di¡erences in the distribution of power between
manufacturer and retailer (see, for example, Smith II [1982] and Slade [1993]).
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should choose the terms of their contracts.8 In what follows, we focus on
the ¢ndings from the literature that examines this dichotomy. We return
brie£y to the issue of standard contract terms within ¢rms at the end of
the section.
Our analysis of the empirical evidence concerning retail contracting
makes use of two sorts of studies. Data for the ¢rst sort are at the level of
the upstream ¢rm (or sector) and describe the extent to which agents
choose to integrate vertically (i.e., the proportion of company-owned
units). These data are typically cross sections of either a large number of
¢rms from a broad range of industries or a number of narrowly de¢ned
retail sectors (e.g., Brickley and Dark [1987], John and Weitz [1988],
Martin [1988], Norton [1988], Lafontaine [1992a], and Scott [1995]). Data
for the second type are either at the level of the downstream unit or the
sales force in a district and refer to whether this unit is integrated with the
upstream ¢rm. These data are typically cross sections from a few upstream
¢rms in a single industry (e.g., Anderson and Schmittlein [1984], Barron
and Umbeck [1984], Anderson [1985], Brickley and Dark [1987], Minkler
[1990], Muris, Sche¡man and Spiller [1992], Shepard [1993], Slade [1993
and 1996], Graddy [1995], and Lafontaine [1995]). The two sets of studies
also di¡er in that the ¢rst involves business-format franchising, whereas
the second includes some traditional-franchising industries in which the
principal is a manufacturer.
Table I summarizes the ¢ndings of studies that assess the integration/
separation choice. In this table, the signs in the ¢nal columns show the
observed e¡ect of a variable of interest on the tendency towards vertical
integration. A minus sign thus indicates a negative correlation with the use
of company operation in a franchised chain or of ``direct sales'' in the
sales-force-integration problem. Moreover, an asterisk next to a plus or
minus sign indicates that the ¢nding in the original paper is statistically
signi¢cant at the 0.05 level based on a two-tailed test. In what follows,
each portion of the table is discussed in turn.
II(i): The E¡ect of Risk
The traditional agency model of retail contracting suggests that increases
in uncertainty, or more precisely in demand variability, increase the need
for agent insurance and thus the desirability of vertical integration.9 Inside
the ¢rm, the agent is given lower-powered incentives and is thus more fully
8 Lafontaine [1992a and 1993] and Sen [1993] have examined instead, or also, the
determinants of the ¢nancial terms of business-format franchise contracts, namely the
royalty-rate and franchise-fee combination. Their results have been generally consistent with
the conclusions one can draw from examining the franchise versus own decision.
9 This assumes that the principal, here the upstream ¢rm, is risk neutral or at least less risk
averse than the agent, or outlet manager.
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insured.10 The notion of uncertainty or risk that is relevant in this context
is the risk that is borne by the agent, not by the manufacturer. In other
words, it is risk at the outlet or downstream level. Unfortunately, data that
measure outlet risk are virtually nonexistent. For this reason, imperfect
proxies are employed. The two most common are some measure of
variation in detrended sales per outlet and some measure of the fraction of
outlets that were discontinued in a particular period of time.11 Available
data are often at the level of the sector rather than at the franchisor or
upstream-¢rm level.12
Table I(i) gives details of ¢ve studies that assess the role of risk in
determining the tendency towards company operation (i.e., vertical in-
tegration). In all but one of these studies, contrary to prediction, increased
risk leads to more franchising (increased separation). Moreover, this
negative association does not depend on the measure of risk that is used.
These results suggest a robust pattern that is unsupportive of the standard
agency model.
II(ii): The Importance of the Agent's E¡ort
The degree to which an increase in agent e¡ort a¡ects output or sales is
also an important parameter in traditional agency models and should
therefore a¡ect the upstream ¢rm's decision to use high or low-powered
incentives. Speci¢cally, the theory predicts that increases in the importance
of the retailer's input should be associated with more separation and
higher-powered contracts. From a practical point of view, the measures
that are used to capture this e¡ect have been determined both by data
availability and by the industry being studied.
Proxies for the importance of the agent's e¡ort (or its inverse) have
included measures of labor intensity, in this case employees/sales or
capital/labor ratios, as the agent is the one who must oversee the provision
of labor. Researchers have also used a measure of the agent's value added
and a variable that captures whether previous experience in the business
is required. Finally, two studies of gasoline retailing rely on a dummy
variable that distinguishes full from self service.
Table I(ii) summarizes the results from ¢ve studies that assess agent
importance. In every case where agent importance is statistically
10We take the empirical regularity that company employees tend to be given lower-powered
incentives as a given and do not attempt to explain its causes. For a possible explanation,
see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994].
11 For a discussion of the relative merits of these two measures, see Lafontaine and
Bhattacharyya [1995].
12Usually the dependent variable and measures of risk are at the same level of aggregation.
The exception is Lafontaine [1992a] who uses ¢rm-level franchising data coupled with
sector-level risk data.
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Table I
Effect of Selected Variables on the Propensity to Vertically Integrate
I(i): Risk
Author Year Data Measure % Co Owned
Anderson and Schmittlein 1984 Electronics Components by
Product Line and Territory
% Forecast Error of Product-Line Sales
by Territory
ÿ





Martin 1988 Sectoral Panel Coe¤cient of Variation of Detrended
Sectoral Sales
ÿ*
Norton 1988 Restaurants and Motels by
State and Sector
Variance of Detrended % Change in
Sectoral Sales by State
ÿ*
Lafontaine 1992 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors
Fraction of Outlets Discontinued in Sector ÿ*























signi¢cant, its relationship with company operation is negative, as
predicted by standard agency considerations and other incentive-based
arguments. In other words, when the agent's e¡ort plays a more signi¢cant
role in determining sales, separation is more likely.
II(iii): The E¡ect of Outlet Size
When an outlet is large, the agent has more responsibility. For this reason,
outlet size has been used in the empirical literature as a measure of the
importance of the agent's input. Not surprisingly then, when it is treated
as a separate parameter a¡ecting contract choice, a standard agency model
predicts that an increase in size should also be associated with separation
and higher-powered incentives.
Unlike the factors discussed above, the measurement of size is fairly
straightforward. Common measures are average sales per outlet and the
initial investment required. Table I(iii) shows that, with one exception,
greater size leads to increased company ownership. In other words,
contrary to what a standard agency model predicts, people responsible for
large outlets tend to be company employees who receive low-powered
incentives.13
II(iv): The Cost of Monitoring
The traditional agency model is based on the assumption that the principal
cannot observe the agent's e¡ort directly. Empirical researchers have taken
this to mean that the di¤culty the principal faces in monitoring the agent
will a¡ect the extent of vertical integration, and they have tested this
proposition.
Finding appropriate proxies for monitoring costs tends to be di¤cult.
For two studies of the electronic-components industry, as well as a
study of distribution channels for industrial-goods producers, which are
labeled Group l in Table I(iv), researchers asked managers to respond
to various statements. In Anderson and Schmittlein [1984] they re-
sponded to ``it is very di¤cult to measure equitably the results of
individual salespeople,'' and in Anderson [1985] the measure was tabulated
from responses to i) ``team sales are common,'' ii) ``sales and cost records
tend to be inaccurate at the individual level,'' and iii) ``mere sales volumes
and cost ¢gures are not enough to make a fair evaluation.'' In John and
Weitz [1988], the length of the selling cycle was used on the basis that a
13 Consistent with the above evidence, Muris, Sche¡man and Spiller [1992] also argue that
the increase in the e¤cient size of bottling operations led soft-drink manufacturers to buy
back several of their independent bottlers and enter into joint-venture agreements with many
others.
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I(ii): The Importance of the Agent's Effort
Author Year Data Measure % Co Owned
Norton 1988 Restaurants and Motels by State
and Sector
Employees/Sales ÿ*
Lafontaine 1992 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors




Shepard 1993 Gasoline Service Stations in
Massachusetts
Full Service ÿ
Scott 1995 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors
Capital/labor Ratio (*)
Slade 1996 Gasoline Service Stations in
Vancouver
Full Service ÿ*
Note: Parentheses in the last column indicate that the relevant variable is an inverse measure of agent e¡ort and is therefore expected to have a sign opposite to the
others.
























Author Year Data Measure % Co Owned
Brickley and Dark 1987 Selected Franchising Firms Initial Investment *
Norton 1988 Restaurants and Motels by State
and Sector
Sales/Outlet ÿ*
Martin 1988 Sectoral Panel Sales/Outlet *






Lafontaine 1995 Fast-Food in Pittsburgh and
Detroit Metropolitan Areas
Number of Seats in an Outlet *
Scott 1995 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors
Initial Investment 


















long lag between actions and market responses makes it di¤cult to
attribute output to e¡ort. Using scores thus obtained as measures of
monitoring costs, these researchers found that higher costs were associated
with more vertical integration.
Another frequently used measure of monitoring di¤culty is some notion
of geographic dispersion (captured in one case by whether the retail unit
is more likely to be in a rural area) or of distance from a monitoring
headquarters. In addition, outlet density has been used as an inverse
measure of monitoring cost. The studies in Table I(iv) that are labeled
Group 2 show that, when monitoring costs are measured either directly by
dispersion or distance or inversely by density, in all cases where coe¤cients
are signi¢cant, higher monitoring costs have a negative e¡ect on the
fraction of company-operated outlets. Thus, higher costs lead to less, not
more, integration.
A principal/agent model in which the principal receives two noisy
signals of an agent's e¡ort sheds light on the discrepancy between these
two sets of ¢ndings. Consider the possibility that the principal can use not
only outcome information (i.e., sales or Type 1) to infer something about
the agent's e¡ort, but also a direct signal of the agent's behavior, which we
call Type 2 information. In other words, direct supervision or monitoring
of the agent's behavior provides the manufacturer with an expanded signal
of retailer e¡ort that supplements the information contained in the sales
data.14 Furthermore, the principal is allowed to base the agent's com-
pensation on both signals. The informativeness principle (Holmstrom
[1979], Milgrom and Roberts, [1992, p. 219]) then suggests that com-
pensation will be based on both types of information. Moreover, the
higher the quality/cost ratio of e¡ort information obtained from sales data
(Type 1 information) relative to that arising via direct supervision (Type
2), the more the compensation package will emphasize sales-based
compensation at the expense of behavior-based compensation. Thus
vertical separation, with its focus on sales-based compensation, will be
more attractive when Type 1 information is relatively less costly to obtain.
The opposite is true of Type 2 information.
Now consider in more detail what the authors of the studies in Table
I(iv) are measuring. Anderson and Schmittlein, Anderson, and John and
Weitz obtained information on the di¤culty of relating sales (Type 1)
results to the performance or e¡ort of individual salespeople. The higher
their measures of monitoring cost, therefore, the poorer are sales data as a
measure of e¡ort. Consequently, companies tend to rely less heavily on
14 The type of mechanism that we have in mind is sometimes called ``behavior-based''
control, as opposed to ``outcome-based'' control (e.g., Anderson and Oliver [1987]). See
Lafontaine and Slade [1996] for a model emphasizing this distinction between these two types
of monitoring.
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this noisy signal of e¡ort and to provide the agent with more insurance.
In other words, they reduce their reliance on output-based compensation;
thus the increased degree of vertical integration.15
With measures of dispersion or distance, in contrast, researchers are
aiming to capture the cost of monitoring the retailer's e¡ort directly
(obtaining Type 2 information). This is accomplished by, for example,
sending in a company representative or a pretend customer in order to
obtain additional information (e.g., on cleanliness, product quality, and
friendly service) that complements sales data. Moreover, in the types of
businesses that are franchised, ¢nal products are apt to be relatively simple
and team sales, uncommon. Hence retail sales ¢gures tend to be good
measures of a unit manager's or a franchisee's e¡ort. In this context, high
monitoring cost means that non-sales data on behavior is costly to obtain,
while sales data are a good signal of e¡ort. This leads the upstream ¢rm
to rely more heavily on sales in its compensation scheme, or rely more
often on vertical separation.
It should be clear that the di¡erent measures that are used in the
empirical literature capture di¡erent types of monitoring costs. When one
takes this di¡erence into account, the ``contradictory'' results obtained by
these researchers are in fact consistent with each other as well as with
standard downstream-incentives arguments for franchise contracting.
II(v): Product Substitutability
The standard incentive-cum-insurance model of retail contracting does
not usually consider the competitive environment in which the principal/
agent relationship operates. Not surprisingly then, most empirical studies
of contract choice also rely solely on attributes of the upstream ¢rm and
its outlets and ignore the ¢rm's competitors. It can be shown, however,
that when one introduces the potential for substitution among competing
¢rms' products into an agency model, one ¢nds that the bene¢ts associated
with separation increase with the degree of substitutability across pro-
ducts. This is true in either a strategic or a more standard agency setting.
In a standard agency setting, one can interpret the substitution e¡ect
as yet another measure of the importance of the agent's e¡ort. The higher
the degree of substitutability, the more important it is for the agent to
promote his product in order to prevent the erosion of its sales. As in
subsection II(ii), therefore, the principal has an additional motive for
emphasizing high-powered incentives relative to other objectives.
To understand the strategic setting, it is helpful to consider a two-stage
15A di¡erent but consistent way to interpret this result is that, in a transaction-cost context,
high uncertainty in a transaction leads to more vertical integration. This is the interpretation
given by the authors.
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I(iv): Monitoring Difficulty
Author Year Data Measure % Co Owned
Group 1
Anderson and Schmittlein 1984 Electronics Components by
Product Line and Territory
Index indicating that it is di¤cult to
measure results of individuals.
*
Anderson 1985 Electronics Components by
Product Line and Territory
Index indicating that 1) team sales are
common, 2) records are inaccurate and 3)
sales and cost ¢gures are insu¤cient for a
fair evaluation.
Importance of Non-selling Activities
*
*
John and Weitz 1988 Industrial Firms with Sales
above $50 million
Length of Selling Cycle *
Group 2
Brickley and Dark 1987 Selected Franchising Firms Distance From Monitoring Headquarters ÿ*
Norton 1988 Restaurants and Motels by
State and Sector
Fraction of State Population Rural ÿ*
Minkler 1990 Taco Bell Restaurants in
Northern California and
Western Nevada
Distance From Monitoring Headquarters
Outlet DensityNumber of Outlets
Within a 5 Mile Radius
ÿ*
(ÿ)
Lafontaine 1992 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors
Number of States in which the chain has
Established Outlets
ÿ*
Lafontaine 1995 Fast Food in Pittsburgh and
Detroit Metropolitan Areas
Outlet DensityNumber of Outlets from
the Same Chain in Same Zip Code
(*)
Scott 1995 Bus. Format Franchising Firms
from All Sectors
Number of States in which the chain has
Established Outlets
ÿ*
Notes: Parentheses in the last column indicate that the relevant variable is an inverse measure of monitoring cost and is therefore expected to have a sign opposite to
the others.























gameöthe separation gameöand contrast it with a static gameöthe
integration game. With the separation game, retail contracts are o¡ered in
the ¢rst period, and price competition occurs in the second. Since
manufacturers anticipate the outcome of the retail game, one can think of
the upstream ¢rms as choosing retail prices. If managers of upstream ¢rms
maximize pro¢ts conditional on rival behavior, it is optimal for them to
set price/cost margins equal to minus one divided by their perceived
elasticities of demand. Their perceived elasticities, however, depend on the
type of game that they are playing. In the separation game, the perceived
elasticity has two components: a direct and a strategic one.16 The direct
component is the own-price elasticity, holding rival price constant,
whereas the strategic component is the cross-price elasticity (the
percentage change in own sales due to a one-percent change in rival price)
times the elasticity of the rival's reaction function (the percentage change
in rival price due to a one percent change in own price). When the two
products are substitutes, these two components have opposite signs, their
sum is smaller in magnitude than the own-price elasticity, and equilibrium
markups are greater than they would be if there were only a direct
component. Furthermore, all else equal, as cross-price elasticities increase,
so do equilibrium markups.
With the integration game, in contrast, principals or upstream ¢rms
choose prices directly; they do not delegate this task to agents. Since there
is no ¢xed fee or wholesale price to choose, the game has only one period,
and, as a consequence, the players' perceived elasticities have only direct
components. In other words, since prices are chosen simultaneously in the
¢rst (and only) period, players cannot condition their price choices on the
terms of own and rival contracts with retailers. They therefore set price/
cost margins equal to minus one divided by the own price elasticity of
demand, which is evaluated holding rival price constant. Equilibrium
markups are then lower than in the separation game.
To our knowledge, Slade [1993] is the only study that looks at contract
choice as a function of the demand characteristics that agents face. She
relates the contracts under which outlets operate to outlet-level own and
cross-price elasticities of demand and to the elasticities of rival-reaction
functions. She ¢nds, as predicted, that delegation is more likely when
cross-price elasticities of demand are large relative to own-price elasticities
and when rival-reaction functions are steep.
II(vi): Franchisee Free Riding
Once an agent is given high-powered incentives via a franchise contract,
16 For an analysis of the role of direct and strategic e¡ects in two-stage games, see Tirole
[1988, pp. 324^336].
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another kind of incentive problem can ariseöthe franchisee can free ride
on the tradename (see e.g., Klein, [1980] and Brickley and Dark, [1987]).
As these authors note, the free-riding problem is more likely to occur in
situations where consumers do not impose su¤cient discipline on retailers,
namely cases of non-repeat businesses. Brickley and Dark [1987] ¢nd that
franchisors rely less on franchising in the three industries that they con-
sider to be most susceptible to free riding: hotels and motels, restaurants,
and car-rental agencies. However, although the free-riding theory also
implies that units of franchised chains located along freeways will tend to
be company operated, they ¢nd the opposite tendency in their data.
The evidence on free riding is thus mixed (see also Brickley, Dark and
Weisbach, [199la], and Minkler [1990] on this). One explanation for the
lack of strong evidence in favor of free riding is that franchisors ¢nd ways
to control franchisee behavior by, for example, using approved supplier
requirements or self-enforcing contracts. The franchisor, unlike the
franchisee, internalizes the spillovers that damage the trademark when free
riding occurs in transient-customer locations such as freeway exits. If this
is so, however, it implies that the role of the franchisor in maintaining
service quality and trademark reputation should be particularly important
in sectors where most business in transient, which in turn leads to the issue
of franchisor incentives in a double-sided moral hazard model of franchise
contracting.
II(vii): Prices at Delegated Outlets
In addition to considering when ¢rms might want to use delegation or
integration, empirical research on retail contracting has also been con-
cerned with some of the consequences of this decision. One area that has
received relatively more attention is the e¡ect of contractual form on the
¢nal prices that consumers pay for the goods that are sold through
separated and integrated units.17
There are a number of reasons why prices might be higher at separated
outlets. First, some transactions are more costly in a market than inside a
¢rm. For example, the types of contracts written with franchisees are often
more complex and thus costlier to write than those written with
employees. Second, because separation involves two ¢rms rather than one,
it may introduce an additional administrative layer. Third, when retailers
have market power, double marginalization (i.e., successive output
restrictions) can arise. Finally, in a strategic model of contracting,
separation lowers retailers' perceived elasticities of demand and thus
increases retail markups (see Rey and Stiglitz, [1995]).
17 Barron and Umbeck [1984] also consider the e¡ect of di¡erent contractual arrangements
on hours of operation.
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Table II summarizes results from seven studies that are relevant to this
issue. Three deal with retail prices of gasoline in the US, another deals
with prices charged by retailers of separated and integrated soft-drink
bottlers, still another involves beer sold in public houses in the UK, and
the last two are concerned with fast-food franchising in certain US
submarkets.
Barron and Umbeck [1984] and Slade [1995] look at legally mandated
changes in contractual arrangements (i.e., before and after studies). Muris,
Sche¡man, and Spiller [1992] also do a before-and-after study in that they
focus on the temporal e¡ect on retail prices of soft-drink manufacturers'
decisions to buy back some of their bottlers. The other studies look at the
e¡ect of contract type on prices in a cross section of contracts. All seven
studies ¢nd that, as predicted by theory, increases in the degree of vertical
separation, whether voluntary or mandated, result in higher retail prices.
II(viii): Within-Firm Contract Uniformity
Most theoretical contracting models allow the principal to tailor the terms
of the contract to suit the characteristics of the agent, the outlet, and the
market. Contracts that are observed in practice, in contrast, are
remarkably insensitive to variations in individual, outlet, and market
conditions. Indeed, many ¢rms use a standard business-format-franchising
Table II
The Effect of Delegation on Price
Author Year Data Price E¡ect





1992 Prices of Retailers Served by
Integrated or Separated Soft-
Drink Bottlers
*





Slade 1995 Beer in the UK *
Lafontaine 1995 Fast-Food in Pittsburgh and
Detroit Metropolitan Areas
*
Graddy 1995 Selected Fast-Food Chains in
New Jersey and Western
Pennsylvania
*
Note: * indicates a result that is signi¢cant in the original study at the 0.05 level, based on a two-tailed
test.
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contractöa single royalty-rate and franchise-fee combinationöfor all of
their franchised operations that join the chain at a point in time. The same
lack of variation is observed in traditional franchising, where a manu-
facturer often charges the same wholesale price to all of her leased
operations.18 When this is true, the only choice that the principal makes in
the end is whether to franchise or to self operate. In other words, when
the characteristics of individual units di¡er, the upstream ¢rm chooses to
operate those with characteristics that require less high-powered
incentives, and to franchise those that require more. This again explains
the focus in empirical work on the choice between integration and
separation rather than on the actual terms of the contract.
Interestingly, in the few empirical studies of the e¡ects of the variables
described above on the terms of the uniform franchise contract (the share
parameter, or royalty rate, and the up-front ¢xed payment, or franchise
fee), authors have found that variables that should a¡ect the share and
¢xed-fee parameters are better at explaining the dichotomous decision to
franchise or not.19 Thus it appears that ¢rms, in responding to risk,
incentive and monitoring-cost issues, adjust by changing how much they
use franchising more than by altering the terms of their uniform franchise
contract. In that sense, the theoretical models seem to be missing some
important aspects of the upstream/downstream relationship.
It has also been found that franchise fees do not extract all downstream
pro¢ts given the royalty rate, as the standard principal-agent model
suggests. Instead, ¢xed fees tend to be set at levels that compensate the
franchisor for expenses incurred in setting up a franchise.20 Finally, once
set, franchise contract terms have been found to be quite persistent over
time.21
II(ix): Asset Speci¢city
Asset speci¢city is an important area of the theoretical literature that we
have, up to now, had little to say about. This is because we believe that it
is far less important for retail contracting than for the purchase and sale of
18 In the US, the Robinson^Patman Act requires wholesale-price uniformity, at least
locally. This is not true, however, in Canada. Nevertheless, uniformity across buyers is
common there as well (e.g., in gasoline markets; see Slade [1993 and 1996] on this). Also, the
Robinson-Patman act does not explain contract uniformity in business-format franchising,
as the Act applies to the sale of commodities, which do not include franchising rights. See
McAfee and Schwartz [1994] and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] for further arguments
against legal constraints generally as the main source of contract uniformity in business-
format franchising.
19 See, for example, Lafontaine [1992a].
20 See Lafontaine [1992a] and Dnes [1993].
21 See Lafontaine and Shaw (1996). The authors suggest that this is due in part to
adjustment costs, and in part to persistent ¢rm e¡ects.
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intermediate inputs.22 As a result, we don't think it sheds much new light
on the empirical regularities highlighted herein. Nevertheless, as this issue
occasionally surfaces in the empirical literature, we discuss how we arrive
at this conclusion.
The positive e¡ect of unit size on company ownership has been
interpreted by some (e.g., Brickley and Dark [1987] and Scott [1995]) as
evidence that franchisors ¢nd it more costly to rely on franchising when
franchisees are required to make large relationship-speci¢c investments.
We, however, ¢nd no evidence that total investment relates positively to
asset speci¢city in retail contracting. For example, the largest gasoline
stations are high-volume self-service stations that are the least specialized.
The owner of such a station, if terminated by one re¢ner, could easily
obtain a contract with another. The value of his assets should therefore
not be signi¢cantly lower outside of the relationship. The same is true in
business-format franchising. Within this group, the hotel industry requires
the largest level of investment. This investment, however, is again not
speci¢c; hotel banners are routinely changed with little e¡ect on property
value.
It has also been argued that franchisors own units in cities, or at
least own the right to leases for city-unit locations, because these
locations are highly speci¢c assets (Dnes, [1993]). We believe that the
di¤culty of obtaining ``good locations'' in city centers is simply a
re£ection of the economic value of those locations, where the economic
value is understood by all potential tenants and thus is clearly not
speci¢c. Hence we again fail to see a direct relationship between high
asset value and high asset speci¢city.23
iii. explaining the discrepancies
Our analysis has uncovered fairly robust patterns in the empirical evidence
concerning retail contracting. While some of these are consistent with
particular aspects of standard contracting models, in particular with the
emphasis on incentive and monitoring issues, it is also clear that the data
are inconsistent with other aspects of these models. In what follows, we
discuss extensions to the basic theoretical framework that show promise in
addressing the thus-far unexplained regularities.
22 Examples of empirical papers that deal with relationship-speci¢c assets in intermediate
input markets include Monteverde and Teece [1982], Masten [1984], Goldberg and Erickson
[1987], Joskow [1988], Crocker and Masten [1991], and Crocker and Reynolds [1993].
23 See also Klein (1995) for an excellent discussion of how self-enforcement in retail
contracting does not rely on the amount of speci¢c assets invested by the parties, but rather
how franchisee or agent opportunism is controlled by the amount of rents the agent expects
to receive from the continuation of the relationship, and how franchisor opportunism is
controlled by the costs of operating the whole chain directly.
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III(i): Risk
The ¢rst problem noted above is the inconsistency of the evidence related
to risk with the insurance argument embedded in the traditional agency
model. The empirical evidence reveals a positive e¡ect of risk, or at least
of sales variability, on franchising. Some authors have concluded from this
that franchisors shed most risk onto franchisees (e.g., Martin [1988]). This
could only be optimal, however, if franchisors were more risk averse than
franchisees, in which case there would be less need to trade o¡ franchisee
incentive and insurance needs, and hence less need to use a share contract.
At the extreme, franchising would involve franchisees paying only lump-
sum fees to franchisors, a situation that is rarely observed in practice.
An alternative, and we believe more satisfactory, explanation for the
risk/franchising phenomenon surfaces when one considers that the power
of incentives can in£uence sales variability. Indeed, franchisees often have
superior information concerning local-market conditions. Moreover, since
franchising gives retailers greater incentives to react to these conditions,
one might well ¢nd more sales variability in franchised than in company-
owned units, even when exogenous risk is the same across the two
groups.24 In that sense, the positive relationship between risk and
franchising may best be understood as further support for incentive-based
arguments for franchising.
III(ii): Outlet Size
The second inconsistency between theory and practice is the fact that
outlet size is positively correlated with integration rather than separation,
which is di¤cult to reconcile with standard agency models of retail
contracting. The positive relationship between size and company
ownership, however, interacts with the urban-location phenomenon that is
used to measure monitoring costs in a robust way. Indeed, large-volume
outlets located in urban areas tend to be company operated, whereas
small-volume rural outlets are much more apt to be run by
entrepreneurs.25 Indeed, franchisors themselves explain the larger size of
company-owned units by stating that it re£ects ``a higher concentration of
company-owned outlets in major urban centers, and with it a higher
investment cost per outlet'' (IFA Educational Foundation and Horwath
24 See Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya [1995] for more on this. Also, although a positive
relationship between incentives and output variability is likely in many cases, whether it
occurs depends in general on the form of the function that maps local information, e¡ort and
the random shock into output.
25 The same relationships that are shown in the tables, which are mostly for business-format
franchising, are also found in traditional franchising such as gasoline retailing and in public
houses that can be operated by a company employee or by a tenant.
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International, 1990, at 1). While lower direct-supervision costs suggest that
urban units should more often be company operated, their larger size
implies the opposite tendency.26 We suggest two further explanations for
why ¢rms might opt for integration for large urban units despite the size
e¡ect.
First, there are economies of scale in promotion that can be captured
at the local level. For example, when a company has many outlets in the
same city, the regional manager, as opposed to the individual-unit
manager, can occupy herself with city-wide promotional activities. This in
turn reduces the importance of the unit manager's inputs, making
company ownership more attractive to the ¢rm. In addition, the
coordination of promotional activities city wide is made simpler by
company ownership. When outlets are isolated, in contrast, comparable
local-promotional e¡orts must be undertaken separately by each agent
and need not be coordinated to the same extent. This makes the
entrepreneurial role of the individual-unit manager extremely important to
the success of the business, leading ¢rms to rely on high-powered
incentives in these units.
Our second explanation is based on the observation that, when franchise
contracts are not fully adjusted to outlet di¡erences, franchisors are apt
to ¢nd that relatively more rent is left downstream to large franchised
outlets than to small.27 When large outlets are company operated, in
contrast, upstream ¢rms are more likely to be able to capture these
rents.28
26 The importance of outlet density for franchisors' decision to own urban units is
supported by the following statement from the 1973 10^K report of the McDonald's
corporation: ``The 860 restaurants owned by the company on December 31, 1973, are
generally concentrated geographically because of economics and managerial e¤ciencies made
possible by their proximity to each other.''
27 See Kaufmann and Lafontaine [1994] for evidence that there are both ex-ante and ex-post
rents left downstream at McDonald's, and that these are larger in absolute and relative terms
in larger-volume units. See also Michael and Moore [1995] on the issue of downstream rents.
Combined with recent evidence from Williams [1996], which shows that franchisors on
average terminate poorly performing units, these results suggest that franchisors create a
premium stream to align franchisee incentives, and that they resort to termination when
franchisees do not perform. See Klein [1995] on various ways in which franchisor and
franchisee incentives might not coincide. See also Brickley, Dark and Weisbach [199lb] for
evidence that franchisors in nonrepeat-business industries franchise less when they face
restrictions on termination of franchisees.
28 A third potential explanation relates to the idea of outlet diversity and task variety.
When a company has many outlets in a city, each may be more specialized. For example,
individual real-estate agencies might specialize in apartment rentals, house sales, and so forth.
In a small town, in contrast a single agency is more apt to have to handle business of all kinds.
It can be shown that, when an agent performs many tasks that are not highly complementary,
the optimal-payment scheme involves higher-powered incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom
[1991] and Slade [1996]). However, we do not know of any empirical study that has contrasted
the degree of specialization of individual units in urban and rural areas, a necessary ¢rst step
in determining the validity of this explanation.
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III(iii): Within-Firm Contract Uniformity
The last way in which the data appear to be inconsistent with the theory
is the tendency for contracts used by ¢rms to be much more standardized
across retailers than most theoretical models would suggest. Models that
emphasize incentive issues for both partiesödouble-sided moral-hazard
modelsöhowever, provide one possible explanation for this lack of
contract ¢ne tuning. These models recognize that, with most franchising
arrangements, not only does the agent have to provide e¡ort, but also the
principal must maintain the value of the trademark or company logo.
Since maintaining the reputation of the chain usually involves costly
activities such as agent monitoring and product promotion that are not
easily observed or assessed by retailers, the principal can also shirk. With
moral hazard on the part of both parties, even when both are risk neutral,
an optimal contract involves revenue sharing (Rubin [1978], Mathewson
and Winter [1985], Lal [1990], and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
[1995]).29
In a double-sided moral-hazard context, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
[1995] show that, under speci¢c assumptions concerning functional forms,
the bene¢ts of customizing contracts can be quite limited, if not zero. This
implies that the optimal contract is insensitive to many relationship-
speci¢c circumstances. In addition, their model might explain some of the
persistence of contract terms over time. Indeed, in their model, the terms
of the optimal contract remain unchanged as the franchise chain grows.30
Another reason that has been advanced in the literature to explain the
lack of customization involves the high costs of customizing, either the
direct cost of designing and administering many di¡erent contracts
(Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] and Lafontaine [1992b]) or the high
potential for franchisor opportunism that arises when contracts can vary
(McAfee and Schwartz [1994]).
iv. summary and conclusions
Table III summarizes the ¢ndings from our survey of the theory and
practice of retail contracting under exclusive marks. It lists predictions
from the standard agency model, the empirical ¢ndings, and possible
29 Carmichael [1983] has shown that with two agents or more and moral hazard on the
principal's side as well as the agents', the ¢rst best can be achieved with a contract based on
relative outputs. However, we do not observe this type of contract in franchising. Why this is
the case is beyond the scope of the present paper.
30More speci¢cally, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] show that, when the production
function is Cobb^Douglas and the cost-of-e¡ort function is exponential, the optimal-share
parameter is independent of the scale of operation, and, as a result, of the level of demand
and the degree of competition in the market. The share parameter is also independent of both
parties' cost-of-e¡ort parameters.
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reconciliations when the two do not agree. As in Table I, the signs in this
table indicate a factor's e¡ect on the fraction of outlets (or of the sales
force) that is vertically integrated by the company, or on the propensity of
an individual outlet (or sales person) to be vertically integrated.
As we have noted in our discussion of the individual tables, this
summary table reveals a number of surprising facts. Perhaps the most
unexpected, however, is that the empirical evidence is fairly consistent
across industries and ¢rms. Indeed, the regularities noted in the
introduction are robust. We contrast this robustness with the predictions
of the theoretical models, which are much more fragile.
It is well known in Industrial Organization that, when one models
imperfect information and strategic interactions, virtually any behavior
can be rationalized. In particular, any outcome can result from the
optimizing choices of rational agents under some set of assumptions. The
problem is therefore not to construct models that predict arbitrary
outcomes, but rather to build robust models that encompass the stylized
facts. We are encouraged to discover that, at least in the retail-contracting
area, these facts are themselves robust in that they do not depend on
peculiarities of the industries that are assessed in each study.
Table III
Summary of Predictions and Findings
Factor Prediction Finding Reconciliation
Risk and Uncertainty  ÿ Local Private Information
Monitoring Di¤culty
Type 1  
Type 2 ÿ ÿ
Agent Importance ÿ ÿ
Outlet Size ÿ  Entrepreneurial EOS,
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